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Abstract 
In 1990, the asset-pricing bubble in Japan peaked and began a steady decline. Over the next 
seven years, a series of bank failures induced the Japanese government to introduce the 
first of a series of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and 2004. The capital injection of 1998, 
authorized by the Financial Functions Stabilization Act, made ¥13 trillion ($103 billion) 
available to financial institutions that applied. By the end of the injection window, 21 banks 
and trusts applied for and received ¥1.8 trillion ($13.5 billion) in subordinated debt and 
loans and preferred shares. While there were no limits on compensation for management, 
the Act restricted dividend payments and required banks to submit restructuring plans. 
However, lack of oversight over bank balance sheets to pursue risk-based injection 
strategies, regulatory forbearance, and banks’ application for capitalization below balance 
sheet needs prevented complete recapitalization of the banks and led to a second 
recapitalization scheme one year later.  
Keywords: capital injection, Financial Crisis Resolution Committee, Japanese Financial 





1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 The Financial Function Stabilization Act is also referred to as the Act for Early Strengthening of Financial 
Functions, the Act on Emergency Measures for the Stabilization of Financial Functions (raw translation), the 
Financial Stabilization Law, or the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law, written as 金融機能安定化法 
in Japanese. 
3 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.  
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 At a Glance  
The bursting of the asset price bubble in 
Japan in 1990 led to the steady decline 
of Japanese asset prices. Due to high 
levels of interconnectedness in the 
system formed through keiretsu 
relationships between banks and firms, 
many banks became deeply 
undercapitalized due to both 
nonperforming loans and devalued 
assets. After the failure of four banks in 
1997, the Japanese Diet passed the 
Financial Functions Stabilization Act on 
February 16, 1998.  
The act allocated ¥13 trillion ($103 
billion) of capital to inject into any bank 
and some non-bank financial 
institutions that applied. The Financial 
Crisis Management Committee (FCMC) 
reviewed each application. The 
applications required that applicants 
submit management improvement 
plans in addition to information on 
capital requests. The capital injections 
were contingent on estimates of need. 
They took the form of subordinated 
debts, loans, and preferred shares 
purchased by the Resolution and 
Collection Bank (RCB), a partial subsidiary of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 
(DICJ). The DICJ funded the RCB’s purchasing through Bank of Japan bond issuances and 




4 Converted based on March 31, 1998 dollar-yen exchange rate. 
5 Converted based on March 31, 1998 dollar-yen exchange rate. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To maintain credit order and the stability of the 
national economy while preventing the failure of 
financial institutions in Japan and overseas 
Announcement Date December 24, 1998 
Operational Date February 16, 1998 
Injection Start Date March 31, 1998 
End of Application 
Window 
March 31, 2003 
Program Size ¥13 trillion ($103 billion)4 
Usage ¥1.8 trillion ($13.5 billion)5 at 
peak utilization 
Eligibility  Any financial institution; some 
nonbank financial institutions 
Participants 21 financial institutions 
Administrator Resolution and Collection Bank 
Legal Authority Passed through the Japanese Diet; 
executed by the Prime Minister’s 
Office and DICJ. 
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Between February 1998 and March 1998, 21 banks applied for capital injections and none 
were rejected. Overall, of the ¥13 trillion allocated, ¥1.8 trillion ($13.5 billion) was used to 
purchase preferred shares and subordinated bonds. Applicant banks, trusts, and regional 
banks received varying capital-underwriting terms. By 2017, all banks had repurchased 
their shares, loans, and debts. 
Summary Evaluation 
Experts believe the injection of 1998 did not fully recapitalize the system; eight months 
after the first recapitalization scheme, the Diet passed a second recapitalization scheme.6 
The inability for the FCMC to examine bank balance sheet information for those banks 
applying, in addition to the policy of regulatory forbearance, prevented a full 
recapitalization of the system. After the capital injection on March 31, 1998, two banks that 
had received injections under this scheme failed and were nationalized under new 





6 For more information on the Prompt Recapitalization Act, please refer to the YPFS case study Unnava 
(2021).   
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Japan Context 1997–1998 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
$4.35 trillion in 1997 
$4.52 trillion in 1998 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
$35,022 in 1997 
$31,903 in 1998 
Sovereign credit rating (Five-year 
senior debt) 








Size of banking system 
$9.86 trillion in 1997 
$9.73 trillion in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage 
of GDP 
226.5% in 1997 
215.1% in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage 
of financial system 
84.1% in 1997 
79.2% in 1998 
Five-bank concentration of banking 
system 
42.6% in 1997 
43.6% in 1998 
Foreign involvement in banking system Data not available for 1997–98 
Government ownership of banking 
system 
Data not available for 1997–98 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 1997 
Yes in 1998 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Financial deregulation in Japan began in the early 1970s (Kanaya and Woo 2000; Nakaso 
2001). However, uneven deregulation of similar activities by different types of financial 
entities had created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage (Kanaya and Woo 2000). Under 
the informal “convoy system,” the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan relied on stronger 
banks to bail out weaker banks (Kanaya and Woo 2000; Nakaso 2001). The convoy system 
created an implicit assumption among market participants that the banking system was 
“fail-safe” as banks expected the Ministry of Finance to offer solutions to problems banks 
faced. Banks supported the system because it facilitated mergers that allowed stronger 
banks to expand their branches, which had previously been a highly regulated activity 
(Nakaso 2001). 
In 1986, the Diet, the legislative body of Japan, revised the Deposit Insurance Act to create a 
formal safety net. The new law provided the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) 
two policy options to address a failed bank: 1) liquidating failed banks, with each depositor 
protected up to ¥10 million; 2) transferring the business of a failed bank to an assuming 
bank. At the time, officials believed the DICJ would draw upon the new fund only in the rare 
event of a small-bank failure. In its first year, the DICJ had an insurance fund of only ¥300 
billion, which was far less than would be needed to rescue a failing large bank (Nakaso 
2001). At the time, the size of deposits for the top 10 banks in the Japanese financial system 
was ¥264 trillion7 (Nash 1988). This deposit insurance system’s small size and inflexibility 
eventually made it inadequate for the coming financial crisis of the 1990s (Nakaso 2001).  
When Japanese stock market and real estate prices collapsed in 1990-92, the initial 
systemic implications appeared limited. The few sporadic financial failures were of limited 
scope and systemic importance (Nakaso 2001). But over the next decade, Japan would slip 
into a period of economic stagnation where real GDP growth fell below 1% for ten years, as 





7 Conversion based on December 31, 1987, dollar-yen exchange rate. Source: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Japan/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate [DEXJPUS], retrieved from FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXJPUS, November 15, 2019. 
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Figure 1: Japan Real GDP Growth, 1956-2012 
 
Source: Lipscy and Takinami 2013, 328.  
Officials were aware at this point that major banks like Nippon Credit Bank were 
transferring bad loans to paper companies to reduce their own balance-sheet exposure, but 
allowed such behavior to continue as the existing infrastructure permitted funneling bad 
debt—a practice known as tobashi that was controversial amongst finance ministry 
officials. By avoiding the liquidation of bad debt through this funneling behavior, banks 
never realized the bad debt at market price, leading to inflated asset values on bank 
balance sheets (Amyx 2006). 
In October 1994, two months before the failures of Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen, two urban 
credit cooperatives, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Yasushi Mieno, gave a speech 
remarking, “It is not the business of the central bank to save all financial institutions from 
failure. On the contrary, failure of an institution that has reasons to fail is even necessary 
from the viewpoint of nurturing a sound financial system” (Nakaso 2001). The Ministry of 
Finance also faced competing interests—given authority of both fiscal policy and financial 
regulation, the Ministry began to prioritize “budgets over banks,” where the use of public 
funds contradicted the balanced budgetary principles in the short term (Amyx 2006). 
At the time, capital requirements for domestic Japanese banks were weaker than 
international standards. Japanese banks were encouraged to meet Basel I capital standards 
but received no formal penalties for noncompliance, as these standards were seen more as 
a managerial guidance (Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 2009). 
The failure of Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen in December 1994 tested the government’s 
infrastructure for dealing with unsound financial institutions. No stronger financial 
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institution was willing to take them over. Also, losses exceeded the amount that the DICJ 
was authorized to provide to protect insured depositors. On December 9, the BOJ 
established a new bank to assume the businesses of the two institutions, wiping out 
existing shareholders, and removing the management of the two institutions. The new 
bank, Tokyo Kyoudou Bank (TKB), was capitalized with ¥40 billion, of which the BOJ 
subscribed ¥20 billion and private financial institutions subscribed ¥20 billion. Private 
financial institutions also extended low-interest loans to the new bank. Virtually all 
Japanese financial institutions participated, providing capital and loans. The DICJ provided 
funds to protect insured depositors. However, the Bank of Japan’s role was controversial. 
Although the law allowed the central bank to provide risk capital to banks in its function as 
lender of last resort, it hadn’t done so since the 1960s (Nakaso 2001).  
Private financial institutions were also increasingly reluctant to contribute to the convoy 
system, worrying about the impact on their own profitability and reputations (Nakaso 
2001). Deregulation had also made it easier for banks to expand without facilitated 
mergers under the convoy system. In 1994, banks, for the first time, outright refused to 
participate in these rescues. In 1995, following another failure by a major bank, Moody’s 
changed its ratings criteria so that it would not take into consideration the possibility of a 
government-organized rescue; in this new system, Japanese banks received an average 
rating of “D” (Amyx 2006). 
At this point, there was little room for the BOJ to ease monetary policy due to already low 
discount rates. As the state of the economy deteriorated, the BOJ began reducing interest 
rates rapidly, dropping the overnight lending rate from 6% in 1990 to 1% by 1995, shown 
in Figure 2 below (Lipscy and Takinami 2013). These low rates meant that from 1995 
onwards, interest income for Japanese savers dropped by approximately ¥1 trillion yen per 
year (Amyx 2006). The central bank also was reluctant to lower rates further in fear of 
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Figure 2: Interest Rates for Bank of Japan. 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
In this environment with little room for monetary policy stimulus, as well as limitations on 
deposit insurance, jusen trouble emerged, beginning in 1993 and reaching full scale by 
1995. Jusen companies—non-bank lenders founded by banks and other financial 
institutions to make housing and real estate development loans—experienced massive 
losses of ¥6.4 trillion. After an intense debate in the Japanese Diet (the legislative body of 
Japan), the Diet passed the first publicly funded package to address the banking problem, 
allocating losses to founder banks, lender banks, agricultural financial institution, and 
public funding (Nakaso 2001). The usage of taxpayer funding to cover the losses of 
unviable, non-depository financial institutions met public outcry; an Asahi poll found 87% 
of the public opposed the jusen bailout (Lipscy and Takinami 2013; Nakaso 2001). As a 
result, the Minister of Finance promised the Diet that no further public-funded injections 
would occur except for the jusen injections (Lipscy and Takinami 2013).  
Banks were also reluctant to take government funding through public injection. Not only 
would injections of public funding increase scrutiny of bank balance sheets, they would 
also call into question management practices and corporate salaries, and allow political 
intrusion into bank management decisions. In addition, issuance of new shares to the 
government would dilute the value of existing shares primarily held by other financial 
institutions and corporations (Amyx 2006).  
By 1997, as the situation grew worse, with the collapse of four banks in succession, the BOJ 
acted as lender of last resort on an unprecedented scale (Nakaso 2001). In December 1997, 
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the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced Japan’s first recapitalization for 
banks in the post-war era (Japan Times 1997b).  
Program Description 
The Diet paired the intended recapitalization under the Financial Functions Stabilization 
Act with an amendment to the Deposit Insurance Act increasing depositor protection. The 
act allocated ¥17 trillion for depositor protection and ¥13 trillion for recapitalization for 
undercapitalized banks (Japan Times 1998i). The FFSA was a temporary measure intended 
to utilize public funding for capital injections to increase stability in the Japanese financial 
system (Nakaso 2001).  
The day after the government announced the recapitalization program, the Nikkei average 
jumped 2.5% in a show of investor relief (Japan Times 1997c). However, some ratings 
agencies continued to downgrade major Japanese banks, with Standard & Poor’s 
downgrades occurring on December 25, one day after the announcement by the LDP (Japan 
Times 1997c). Moody’s kept ratings low, even after banks began applications for 
recapitalization in March 1998 (Japan Times 1998k).  
After finalizing the banking bills, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Cabinet submitted 
the finalized version of two bills—one for increased depositor protection and one for 
recapitalization—to the Diet on January 19, 1998 (Japan Times 1998e). To encourage the 
passage of the bills, Prime Minister Hashimoto unconventionally visited the Diet to give a 
series of speeches on the necessity of the financial system stability measures (Japan Times 
1998a; Japan Times 1998b; Japan Times 1998d; Japan Times 1998f). After passing the 
Lower House on February 7, the bills passed the Upper House on February 16 and were 
formally enacted into law (Japan Times 1998h; Japan Times 1998i).  
Before the recapitalization bill passed, the Japanese government worked to encourage 
banks to participate in the program, hoping that the vocal participation of stronger banks 
would encourage weaker rivals to participate as well (Japan Times 1998c). Several banks 
applied for the funding simultaneously on March 5, 1998 (Japan Times 1998k). 
The Financial Crisis Management Committee (FCMC) oversaw the recapitalization. It 
consisted of seven members, including three from the private sector, the Minister of 
Finance, the Commissioner of the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), the President of the 
Bank of Japan, and the President of the DICJ. The Cabinet appointed members of the 
committee with consent from both houses of the Diet (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 
1998). Dr. Yoko Sazanami, an academic at Keio University in Japan, chaired the committee 
(Madden and Dimand 2018). The FCMC, part of the DICJ, was responsible for identifying 
banks in need of capital injections and determining the amount and terms of such 
injections (Madden and Dimand 2018; Nakaso 2001). The Cabinet was responsible for 
terminating the operation of the FCMC (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998).  
The DICJ was responsible for the asset management operations of the capital injections 
specified by the FCMC (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998). The DICJ purchased 
preferred shares or subordinated bonds from the financial institutions that applied for 
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capital under the recapitalization scheme (DICJ 2020; Financial Functions Stabilization Act 
1998). The Crisis Management Account, an account set up for purchases under the FFSA, 
held the DICJ purchases (DICJ n.d.). 
No banks were ineligible under the FFSA; while there was some debate about making the 
injections compulsory for certain banks, the idea was ultimately abandoned (Financial 
Functions Stabilization Act 1998; Nakaso 2001). Three non-bank financial institutions, all 
cooperatives, were also eligible, referred to by name in the law: Norinchukin Bank8; the 
Agricultural Cooperative Association; and the Federation of Fisheries Cooperative 
Associations (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998).  
Banks requesting funding applied through the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA), Japan’s bank regulator, who then applied on their behalf. The FCMC itself did 
not have supervisory power and could not look at any detailed balance sheet or 
supervisory information on the applicant banks (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 
1998; Nakaso 2001). These banks would be required to submit management improvement 
plans through the FSA. In the plans, the banks would describe how they would improve 
management and operations, and secure assets. After the FCMC approved an application, it 
would go to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet for approval, by either the Prime Minister or the 
Minister of Finance. Once approved, the DICJ would purchase preferred shares, 
subordinated debt, or subordinated loans (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998).  
Outcomes 
In March 1998, 21 institutions applied for capital injections. Figure 3 below shows a table 
of the applications for capital made public.  
The total application size amounted to close to ¥2 trillion. Within a week, the FCMC 
approved all 21 banks for the capital injections. However, two banks that had applied for 
subordinated debt and loans received less than requested, as the FCMC believed the use of 
such lower-quality capital would not sufficiently boost their capital adequacy ratios (Japan 
Times 1998l). In March 1998, ¥1.8 trillion was injected into 21 banks, averaging 1.9% of 
risk-weighted assets (DICJ 2020; Giannetti and Simonov 2013). Every bank eventually 
repurchased the shares and subordinated debts sold to the DICJ under this program, as 





8 Norinchunkin Bank is a cooperative bank for agricultural, fishing, and forestry cooperatives in Japan.  
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Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 100 SB 0.1 8.6 
Sumitomo Bank 100 SB 0.2 8.9 
Sanwa Bank 100 SB 0.2 8.5 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 99 PS 0.3 8.3 
Fuji Bank 100 SB — 8.6 
Sakura Bank 100 SB 0.1 8.4 
Tokai Bank 100 SL 0.4 8.9 
Asahi Bank 100 SL 0.4 8.4 
Daiwa Bank 100 SL 0.8 8.2 
Industrial Bank of Japan 100 SB 0.3 9 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 200 PS SL 1.3 8.8 
Nippon Credit Bank 290 SL PS 1 7 
Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corp. — — — 
 
Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co.  100 SB 0.8 9-plus 
Mitsui Trust and Banking Co.  100 SB 1 9.5 
Yasuda Trust and Banking Co. 150 SB 1.2 10.8 
Toyo Trust and Banking Co. 50 SB 0.7 10 
Chuo Trust and Banking Co. 60 PS SL 2 9.4 
Bank of Yokohama  20 SL 
  
Hokuriku Bank — SL — 
 
Ashikaga Bank — — — 8.1 
Note: the capital adequacy ratio projections are projected from Sept 1997. SB is short for 
subordinated bonds, SL for subordinated loans, and PS for preferred shares. The mark “—" 
means that the banks did not disclose data. 
Source: Japan Times 1998k.  
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Figure 4: Timeline of subordinated debt and loan repurchasing 
Bank Final Repurchase Date 
Fuji Bank Mar-04 
Industrial Bank of Japan Mar-04 
Yasuda Trust & Banking Sep-04 
Sakura Bank Mar-03 
Sumitomo Bank Mar-03 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Feb-00 
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Dec-00 
Sanwa Bank Mar-03 
Tokai Bank Mar-03 
Toyo Trust & Banking Mar-03 
Asahi Bank Oct-05 
Daiwa Bank Sep-05 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Mar-03 
Mitsui Trust & Banking Mar-05 
Chuo Trust & Banking Mar-03 
Bank of Yokohama May-03 
Hokuriku Bank Mar-06 
Ashikaga Bank Mar-04 
Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Mar-03 
Source: DICJ 2020. 
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Figure 5: Timeline of preferred share repurchasing.  
Bank Final Repurchase Date 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Aug-04 
Chuo Trust and Banking Jul-06 
Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Nov-17 
Nippon Credit Bank Jun-15 
Source: DICJ 2020. 
The Japanese Diet passed a second, much larger recapitalization scheme, the Prompt 
Recapitalization Act, within a year of the FFSA injections. The new scheme made available 
an additional ¥25 trillion for capital injections into sound banks with liquidity needs. Under 
this scheme, the Japanese government ultimately allocated ¥8.6 trillion total.  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Diet passed the Financial Functions Stabilization Act as part of a suite of 
financial stabilization bills that also included an amendment to the Deposit 
Insurance Act. 
In December 1997, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party announced the first Japanese 
recapitalization for banks in the post-war era (Japan Times 1997b). In a separate bill, the 
Diet amend the Deposit Insurance Act (Japan Times 1998h; Japan Times 1998i). Through 
the new bills, a total of ¥30 trillion of public funds was made available: ¥17 trillion for the 
DICJ to cover the losses of failed financial institutions (up from an original ¥300 billion); 
¥13 trillion for capital injections into banks (Nakaso 2001). 
Prime Minister Hashimoto also announced a ¥2 trillion income tax reduction, aimed at 
jump-starting the economy, on December 17, 1997. The tax cut was funded through 
government-issued bonds and was submitted to the Diet as a supplement to the fiscal year 
1997 budget (Japan Times 1998a). On February 4, 1998, the Diet passed a supplementary 
budget that provided financing for the ¥2 trillion personal income tax cut (Japan Times 
1998g).  
The legislation was the first in a series of capital injections from 1998–2008, with a second 
capital injection in March 1998 and a third injection legislation in June 2004 (Hoshi and 
Kashyap 2010). 
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2. The Japanese Diet thoroughly debated the Financial Functions Stabilization Act, 
which provided a legal basis for the capital injection, and announced it publicly; 
Prime Minister Hashimoto made a series of rare floor speeches during this time. 
In December 1997, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party announced the first Japanese 
recapitalization for banks in the post-war era (Japan Times 1997b). The day after the 
announcement of the recapitalization, the Nikkei average jumped 2.5% in a show of 
investor relief. However, some ratings agencies continued downgrading major Japanese 
banks, with Standard & Poor’s downgrades occurring on December 25, one day after the 
announcement by the LDP (Japan Times 1997c). Moody’s kept ratings low, even after banks 
began applications for recapitalization in March 1998 (Japan Times 1998k).  
The Financial Functions Stabilization Act established the intended recapitalization. The 
FFSA was a temporary measure intended to utilize public funding for capital injections to 
increase stability in the Japanese financial system (Nakaso 2001). The act allocated ¥13 
trillion ($103 billion) for the recapitalization of undercapitalized banks (Japan Times 
1998i).  
After finalizing the banking bills, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Cabinet submitted 
the finalized version of two bills—one for increased depositor protection and one for 
recapitalization—to the Diet on January 19, 1998 (Japan Times 1998e). To encourage the 
passage of the bills, Prime Minister Hashimoto unconventionally visited the Diet to give a 
series of speeches on the necessity of the financial system stability measures (Japan Times 
1998a; Japan Times 1998b; Japan Times 1998d; Japan Times 1998f).  
Additionally, prior to the passage of the bill, the Japanese government worked to encourage 
banks to participate in the program, praising banks choosing to participate in the program 
in the hope that the vocal participation of stronger banks would encourage weaker rivals to 
participate as well (Japan Times 1998c).  
After passing the Lower House on February 7, the bills passed the Upper House on 
February 16 and were formally enacted into law (Japan Times 1998h; Japan Times 1998i).  
3. The Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) funded the capital injections 
and the Financial Crisis Management Committee, a committee of the DICJ, 
oversaw them. 
To apply for funding, banks would submit plans to the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), 
who would then apply to the FCMC on their behalf (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 
1998).  
The FCMC served as an in-house committee of the DICJ (Japan Times 1998j). As the Prime 
Minister’s office hoped to have injections done before April 1, 1998, the beginning of the 
new fiscal year, the FCMC was on a strict timeline (Japan Times 1998h). The FCMC 
consisted of seven members, with three members from the private sector, the Minister of 
Finance, the Commissioner of the Financial Supervisory Agency, the President of the Bank 
of Japan, and the President of the DICJ (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998). Yoko 
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Sazanami, an academic at Keio University, chaired the Committee, though domestic finance 
was outside of Sazanami’s research focus as an international economist (Madden and 
Dimand 2018). The Cabinet-appointed members of the committee were appointed with 
consent from both houses of the Diet (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998). The 
Cabinet was responsible for terminating the operation of the FCMC (Financial Functions 
Stabilization Act 1998). 
The FCMC met six times between February 16 and March 31 (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 
2001). The committee decided votes through simple majority, with the Chairperson acting 
as the tie-breaking vote. After the decision passed through the committee, it was sent to the 
Cabinet for full approval. In the case of credit cooperatives, also eligible for capital injection 
under the Financial Functions Stabilization Act, the law required the prefectural governor 
also be consulted. In the case of the Federation of Agricultural and Fisheries Cooperative 
Associations, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries was consulted (Financial 
Functions Stabilization Act 1998). 
The Resolution and Collection Bank (RCB), the asset management corporation tasked with 
holding the preferred shares and subordinated loans and debts of the banks applying for 
capital injection, was formed from the reorganization of the Tokyo Kyoudou Bank in June 
1996. At its formation, the RCB had a broader role as an assuming bank for failed credit 
cooperatives, when there were no assuming banks in the private sector. In addition, the 
RCB could purchase non-performing loans from failed financial institutions, increasing the 
incentives for solvent institutions to assume the failed institution (Nakaso 2001). After 
restructuring, the RCB became a 75% subsidiary of the DICJ, receiving ¥120 billion in 
capital from the DICJ, ¥20 billion from the Tokyo Kyoudou Bank, and ¥20 billion from the 
Bank of Japan (DICJ 2002; Nakaso 2001).  
The DICJ acts independently of the Bank of Japan or the Treasury, though in close 
cooperation. The issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds, as well as annual budgetary 
appropriations, funds the DICJ’s financial assistance. In rare instances, the DICJ may borrow 
money directly from the Bank of Japan (FSB 2016). Funding for the FFSA came from ¥3 
trillion of special government bonds that the DICJ could cash on request, and ¥10 trillion in 
government-guaranteed credit lines (Nakaso 2001). 
Through the RCB, the DICJ purchased the preferred shares and subordinated debts of 
banks out of the crisis management account (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010; DICJ n.d.).  
4. Participation was voluntary and open to any domestic or foreign bank, as well as 
specified nonbank financial institutions. 
Any domestic or foreign bank was eligible for a capital injection, though no foreign banks 
participated in the injection (Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998; DICJ n.d.). Credit 
cooperatives as well as Shinkin banks, a type of cooperative regional credit union, were 
also eligible. In addition to the financial institutions eligible for capital injection, a set of 
non-bank financial institutions, all cooperatives, were also eligible: Norinchukin Bank, 
Agricultural Cooperative Association, and the Federation of Fisheries Cooperative 
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Associations (DICJ 1998a). The law did not require the participation of any banks, though 
there was some debate regarding forced injections during the summer of 1998 during 
discussions to amend the capital injection framework. However, this idea was ultimately 
abandoned (Nakaso 2001). 
There were some standards for screening in determining whether the banks needed 
capitalization: banks could not be losing money for three years prior to application, the 
banks applying were important to the financial and credit system, and banks were unlikely 
to fail. Details are shown in Figure 6 below.  
Figure 6: Screening standards for applicant banks 
In the case of a receiving financial institution such as a merger 
Standard 1 The applicant financial institution is in a situation where its capital adequacy has 
deteriorated due to merger, etc. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the capital adequacy ratio is recognized to have 
declined before and after the merger. 
Standard 2 If the capital adequacy situation is not improved, there is a risk that maintenance of 
the credit order and stability of the regional economy may be seriously affected. 
Standard 3 Must not exceed the scope necessary for the smooth implementation of resolution. 
The larger of the following shall be the limit for underwriting of preferred stock, etc. 
(1) Amount required to recover to the level of capital adequacy before the 
merger. 
(2) Amount necessary to secure 8% (4% in the case of domestic standards) of 
risk assets of bankrupt financial institutions that have been added up due 
to mergers, etc. 
For general financial institutions 
Standard 1 The management status of the applying financial institution has not deteriorated 
significantly. 
Not applicable to any of the following. 
(1) For the last three consecutive years, recurring profit or net profit has been 
in the red or no dividends. 
(2) Be the third category as the trigger for early corrective action. Or, the 
capital adequacy ratio, which is the second category and does not assume 
underwriting of preferred stock, etc., is expected to remain in that category 
even after one year. 
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Standard 2 If the capital adequacy situation is not improved, it may cause one of the following 
situations. 
(1) There is a risk that the financial function in Japan may be significantly 
impaired. 
(2) There may be a significant obstacle to economic activities such as 
corporate activities and employment situation in the region and field. 
In making this decision, it is important to address promptly without overlooking the 
slightest signs of financial system anxiety. 
Standard 3 The purpose is not to rebuild the management of the applying financial institution, 
but to maintain the credit order. 
Standard 4 The applicant’s financial institution is not considered to have a high probability of 
failing even after it has subscribed for preferred shares. 
Standard 5 Disposal of preferred stock, etc., is not recognized as being extremely difficult after a 
considerable period of time. 
In making this decision, take into account the financial status and profit level of the 
applicant financial institution, the prospect of improvement in the asset content and 
capital ratio, the merchandise of the preferred shares to be underwritten, the current 
market situation, and other factors. 
Source: DICJ 1998a based on author’s translation. 
In addition to providing information in an application to determine whether banks met the 
screening criteria, banks also were required to submit management soundness plans, 
where they described plans to improve management structure, secure assets owned, and 
improve operations. These plans would be made public unless they could create 
uncertainty in the public about the bank’s performance (DICJ 1998b). Under this, three 
banks that received public funds—the Long Term Credit Bank, Chuo Trust, and Nippon 
Credit Bank—publicly announced their intention to trim staff, promising to cut 2,900 
employees over the following three years (Japan Times 1998m). 
5. The underwriting terms of capital injections were dependent on capitalization 
status as reported by banks. 
The FCMC was responsible for determining underwriting terms for preferred shares and 
subordinated debt issued through the recapitalization scheme (Financial Functions 
Stabilization Act 1998; Nakaso 2001). The FCMC determined the terms of the capital 
injections on a case-by-case basis. Banks received differing yield rates on subordinated 
bonds ranging from LIBOR + 0.55 percent to as high as LIBOR + 2.95 percent. After five 
years, the rates on subordinated bonds were raised by 1.50 percent. Banks selling 
preferred shares had differing conversion dates (DICJ 2020). The preferred shares 
purchased were converted to common shares after a grace period; Kanaya notes when 
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examining a similar policy utilized in the March 1999 capital injection that the conversion 
of common shares gave the government the opportunity to act as an activist shareholder, 
forcing restructuring if dissatisfied with the bank’s progress (DICJ 2020; Kanaya and Woo 
2000). While banks had the ability to acquire shares with approval by the DICJ, in practice, 
the small windows before conversion (at most seven months after the injection) led to all 
preferred shares in the injection being converted to common shares (DICJ 2020; Financial 
Functions Stabilization Act 1998). 
Unlike the later recapitalization legislation, the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the law did not 
give the FCMC supervisory power as it was housed in the DICJ, a non-supervisory 
institution (Nakaso 2001). The FFSA instead required banks to self-report balance sheet 
information checked by independent auditors to the Financial Supervisory Agency. Banks 
applying for capital injections under the FFSA also were required to submit self-
assessments on the quality of assets on their balance sheets to the Financial Supervisory 
Agency. Certified public accountants audited these self-assessments as well (FSA 1998). 
These assets were partitioned into four categories:  
Category I assets were assets not considered needing risk management in any form and 
were collectable;  
Category II assets were credit exposures for which banks judged that adequate risk 
management on an exposure-by-exposure basis would be needed; 
Category III assets were those about which banks had serious concerns in terms of their 
collection and were likely to incur losses, but banks were unable to determine the timing or 
size of the losses; 
Finally, category IV losses were exposures that banks were unable to collect or valueless 
(FSA 1998). 
Under this assessment structure, banks estimated the size of their categories II, III, and IV 
assets to be ¥65.3 trillion, ¥8.7 trillion, and ¥2.7 trillion respectively as of January 1998 
(FSA 1998). The self-assessment results under the FFSA are shown in Figure 7 below.  
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Figure 7: Results of self-assessment of asset quality for Japanese Banks applying for 
recapitalization under the Financial Function Stabilization Act (in billions of yen) 
Self-Assessment Result of Asset Quality 
  Total Credit Exposure 
    Category I Category II Category III 
Total of All Banks       648,506     576,548        65,763            6,073  
Major Banks       452,374     402,018        45,418            4,816  
Regional Banks       196,132     174,530        20,345            1,257  
Cooperative Type Financial Institutions       146,617     130,923        14,846               845  
Shinkin Banks         74,563       64,411          9,753               397  
Credit Cooperatives         15,342       12,801          2,223               318  
Agricultural Cooperatives         29,961       28,626          1,304                 31  
Total       795,123     707,471        80,609            6,918  
Note: Due to write-off and provisions, banks whose closing account month is March do not 
have Category IV assets. However, for banks that have trust accounts, the closing time of 
the trust account is different from that of the banking account, therefore there is non-
disposal of Category IV assets (¥118 billion), and total credit exposure includes the amount 
of Category IV. 
Source: Financial Supervisory Agency 1998.  
Institutions submitted these audits to the Financial Supervisory Agency, which was 
responsible for submitting the application to the FCMC (FSA 1998; Financial Functions 
Stabilization Act 1998).  
6. There were no limits on shareholder compensation or management 
compensation. 
Unlike its successor, the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the FFSA did not place any 
moratorium on management compensation or dividends under the law. However, there 
was a requirement to pay some portion of the dividends to the DICJ, based on cabinet 
ordinance.  
Average pay for executives of these banks varied by each bank. Some banks, such as the 
Tokai Bank, did not show a reduction in average pay but posited that the costs would 
decrease as the makeup of executive boards changed. Other banks such as the Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi showed cost cutting through maintaining average pay and decreasing the 
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number of executives. Most of the 21 banks planned to pay their executives ¥20 million or 
more a year, and stated so as part of their public restructuring plans (Japan Times 1998n).  
7. There was no explicit exit strategy outlined or mandated for banks participating 
in the capital injection. 
All banks receiving a capital injection in the form of subordinated loans or debt had step-up 
clauses on the debt or loans injected. The step-up clauses, increasing the yield of the bonds 
and debts, would come into effect six years after the injection. Each yield rate and change in 
rates varied by bank. In addition, a majority of the subordinated loans and debts purchased 
were perpetual, never expiring (DICJ 2020). 
Banks receiving preferred shares faced mandatory conversion dates on the issued 
preferred shares. These mandatory conversion dates were set to take place within eight 
months of the capital injection (DICJ 2020). 
All banks receiving capital injections repurchased their shares, loans, and debt, within ten 
years, with the exception of Nippon Credit Bank and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, 
which repurchased their debts in June 2015 and November 2017, respectively (DICJ 2020). 
In the summer of 1998, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan failed, leading to the Financial 
Reconstruction Law, under which the Japanese government nationalized the bank. The 
Nippon Credit Bank followed in December 1998, and was nationalized under the same 
legislation (Nakaso 2001).  
III. Evaluation 
Many experts write that the capital injection of March 1998 was too small for the size of 
non-performing loans in the financial system. Within twelve months of this capital 
injection, two banks receiving capital, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon 
Credit Bank, failed and were subsequently nationalized (Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 
2009). Months after, the Diet passed a much larger capital injection scheme, the Prompt 
Recapitalization Act, allocating more funding and injecting more than quadruple the 
amount injected under the Financial Functions Stabilization Act. Montgomery and 
Shimizutani find that this second injection was more effective than the first round, as the 
first round primarily helped Japanese banks clear the 8% BIS capitalization ratio, but did 
not increasing lending, encourage restructuring, or increase write-offs of non-performing 
loans (Montgomery and Shimizutani 2009).  
This was compounded by the capital requirements for domestic Japanese banks, which 
were weaker than international standards, at 4% necessary capitalization rather than the 
Basel Committee’s 8% capitalization ratio as part of Basel I standards (Allen, Chakraborty, 
and Watanabe 2009). In addition to weaker capital standards, the authorities also 
weakened accounting standards to allow banks to avoid marking down the depressed 
value of real estate and stocks. The allowed up to 45% of unrealized gains on securities to 
be counted as Tier II capital for banks with international operations. They also changed 
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regulations to allow banks the option of not applying the lower of cost or market 
accounting for equities held for investment purposes (Kanaya and Woo 2000). These 
accounting measures were not treated as formal requirements until after the FFSA capital 
injections had already been performed, and the authorities did not require mark-to-market 
accounting even after the recapitalization scheme was enacted (Allen, Chakraborty, and 
Watanabe 2009).  
The policy of regulatory forbearance also affected the speed and size of the Japanese 
response to the non-performing loan problem. Japan was facing the “first instance of a 
‘return to depression economics’ by an advanced developed economy in the post-World 
War II period” (Lipscy and Takinami 2013). The Liberal Democratic Party was increasingly 
vulnerable electorally during this time, providing opponents opportunity to criticize 
regulatory breakdown if the LDP acknowledged issues in the financial system through 
publicly funded capital injections (Amyx 2006). Japanese policymakers faced a skeptical 
public, reducing the ease with which correctional legislation could be passed; in particular, 
the lack of convincing precedent for recapitalizations made it difficult for Japanese political 
leaders to convince the public of its efficacy. Effective legislation also required trial and 
error (Lipscy and Takinami 2013).  
The difficulty in experimentation, combined with the belief that the situation would 
eventually right itself, contributed to regulatory forbearance, such as relaxed accounting 
standards and concealing issues on balance sheets rather than addressing them. This 
experimentation and reluctance to immediately address the situation lead to the extended 
timeline for the financial crisis response in comparison to the United States during the 
Global Financial Crisis (Lipscy and Takinami 2013). 
Japanese policymakers also encouraged or assisted the behavior of overstating stability in 
the Japanese market. Under the belief that the market would eventually right itself, the 
Ministry of Finance reported overly optimistic growth projections. From 1991–98, the EPA 
over-projected growth rates (Amyx 2006). 
The limited supervisory capacity of the FCMC also affected the efficacy of injections under 
the recapitalization scheme. Allen et al show the capital injection of 1999 succeeded in 
comparison to the injections of 1998 due to the risk-based liability evaluations for capital 
injections in the Prompt Recapitalization Act, where regulators had access to bank balance 
sheets, in comparison to the Financial Function Stabilization Act, where the commission 
overseeing injections was unable to look at bank balance sheets (Allen, Chakraborty, and 
Watanabe 2009; Nakaso 2001). Without information allowing regulators to discern 
between individual bank’s risk exposures, regulators could not determine whether certain 
bank applications required more capital than requested. 
This allowed banks to apply for similar capital injection amounts, regardless of their 
balance sheet needs. Banks’ fear of being singled out as a weak bank led to several banks 
applying for far less capital than they needed, with most banks matching the amount 
applied for by the healthiest bank. In applying for capital, banks banded together and 
applied independently and simultaneously, setting their capital application amount to the 
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same amount as the healthiest bank in the system in an attempt to hide which bank was 
truly the weakest bank (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). This, paired with the self-assessment 
and reporting on non-performing loans on balance sheets and inability for the FCMC to 
examine bank balance sheets through supervisory capacities, prevented the capitalization 
of banks at the amount needed by the Japanese financial system. 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
(Nakaso 2001) The Financial Crisis in Japan during the 1990s: How the Bank of Japan 
Responded and the Lessons  Learnt  




(Financial Functions Stabilization Act 1998) 金融機能の安定化のための緊急措置に関する
法律 
The original text of the Financial Functions Stabilization Act in Japanese.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjinengnoandinghuanotamenojinjicuozhiniguansu
rufalu-financial-functions-stabilization.  
(Outline of Examination Criteria for Underwriting of Preferred Stock, Etc.) 優先株式等の引
受け等の審査基準の概要. 




(Japan Times 1997b) LDP Calls for Further DIC Guarantees  
An article describing the Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal for additional support for banks 
to bolster their capital.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ldp-calls-further-dic-guarantees.  
(Japan Times 1997c) Nikkei Rises above 15,000  
An article describing the gains to the Japanese stock index due to positive investor sentiment 
regarding the announcements of government support to the banking industry.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nikkei-rises-above-15000.  
(Japan Times 1998a)Parties Unite over Policy: New Alliance Calls for Tax Cuts Worth ¥6 
Trillion  
An article describing policy proposals for tax cuts.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/parties-unite-over-policy-new-alliance-calls-tax-cuts-
worth-y6-trillion.  
(Japan Times 1998b) Hashimoto Vows Efforts to Protect Financial System. 
An article describing the Prime Minister’s address to the Diet and his focus on supporting the 
310
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
financial system.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/hashimoto-vows-efforts-protect-financial-system.  
(Japan Times 1998d) Hashimoto Restates Need for Stability   
An article describing the Prime Minister’s statement regarding the need to pass financial 
stabilization measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/hashimoto-restates-need-stability.  
(Japan Times 1998e)C abinet Sends Crisis Banking Bills to Diet  
An article announcing that several bills to support the banking sector were sent to the 
legislature. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/cabinet-sends-crisis-banking-bills-diet.  
(Japan Times 1998f) Convoy System” Ruled out: Hashimoto Pushes Plan to Aid Banks 
An article describing the continued efforts by the Japanese prime minister and government 
officials to provide capital injections to struggling banks.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/convoy-system-ruled-out-hashimoto-pushes-plan-aid-
banks.  
(Japan Times 1998g)Diet Approves ¥1.14 Trillion Extra Budget   
An article announcing that the legislature had formally approved a supplementary budget 
that included tax cuts.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/diet-approves-y114-trillion-extra-budget.  
(Japan Times 1998h) Lower House Passes Two Key Bank Bills   
An article announcing that the House of Representatives had passed two bank support bills. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/lower-house-passes-two-key-bank-bills.  
(Japan Times 1998i)Diet OKs Bills Allowing Public Aid for Banks  
An article announcing the legislature’s approval of the bank support measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/diet-oks-bills-allowing-public-aid-banks.  
(Japan Times 1998j)DIC Members Prioritize Finance System Stability   
An article noting that an in-house Deposit Insurance Corporation committee’s members 
agreed on the importance of financial stability measures as well as preventing abuse of the 
bank support measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/dic-members-prioritize-finance-system-stability.  
(Japan Times 1998k) ¥2 Trillion Requested: 21 Banks Apply to Receive Public Funds   
An article announcing that 21 Japanese commercial banks had applied for recapitalization 
under the bank support measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/y2-trillion-requested-21-banks-apply-receive-public-
funds.  
(Japan Times 1998l) ¥1.8 Trillion Injection: All 21 Banks to Get Public Funds   
An article announcing that all 21 banks that had applied for recapitalization were approved 
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to receive capital injections to strengthen their capital bases.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/y18-trillion-injection-all-21-banks-get-public-funds.  
(Japan Times 1998r) ¥1.4 Trillion in Funds Allocated for 17 Banks   
An article announcing that the cabinet approved capital injections into 17 banks as part of 
the bank support measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/y14-trillion-funds-allocated-17-banks.  
(Nash 1988). Japan’s Banks: Top 10 in Deposits   
A New York Times story noting that Japanese banks accounted for the top 10 largest banks by 
deposits. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/japans-banks-top-10-deposits.  
Bank Crisis Bills to Pass Diet Monday.   
An article announcing that bank support bills were expected to be enacted the following week. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-crisis-bills-pass-diet-monday.  
Banks Praised for Accepting Public Funds.  
An article describing the government’s support and approval of the banks that took part in 
the recapitalization program.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/banks-praised-accepting-public-funds.  
Bill Earmarks ¥10 Trillion: Funds Would Be Used to Purchase Ailing Banks’ Shares.   
An article describing a proposed bill that would recapitalize struggling banks.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bill-earmarks-y10-trillion-funds-would-be-used-
purchase-ailing-banks-shares.  
LDP Approves Capital Injection for Norinchukin, Farm Banks.   
An article describing the government’s approval of capital injections for Norinchukin and 
farm banks.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ldp-approves-capital-injection-norinchukin-farm-banks.  
Moody’s Unmoved by Bailout Plan.   
An article noting that the government support plan did not change the negative outlook 
forecast by Moody’s.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/moodys-unmoved-bailout-plan. 
Stimulus Measures yet to Convince Market .  
An article noting that the stimulus measures and bank support measures were considered 
insufficient by international officials and investors.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/stimulus-measures-yet-convince-market. 
Surprise Tax Cut Unveiled: ¥2 Trillion Reduction in Income, Resident Levies (Japan Times 
1997a).  
An article describing a tax cut in income and resident taxes as part of the supplementary 
budget. 
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(Japan Times 1998m) Three Banks Receiving Public Funds Will Trim Staff . 
An article announcing that three of the banks receiving capital injections had plans to cut a 
total of 2,000 employees over three years under their restructuring plans  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/three-banks-receiving-public-funds-will-trim-staff.  
Worst of Financial Crisis Is over, Mitsuzuka Says.  
An article describing the finance minister’s statements regarding the recovery from the 
financial crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/worst-financial-crisis-over-mitsuzuka-says.  
Reports/Assessments 
(Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 2009) Regulatory Remedies for Banking Crises: Lessons 
from Japan   
An overview of the regulatory policies of the Japanese government during the early parts of 
the financial crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/regulatory-remedies-banking-crises-lessons-japan. 
(Amyx 2006) Japan’s Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change  
A book on the differing political incentives and structures contributing to the regulatory 
forbearance policies of Japan in the 1990s.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/japans-financial-crisis-institutional-rigidity-and-
reluctant-change.  
(Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 2001 Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan)  
This book analyzes the financial policy and central banking policies in Japan prior to and 
after the financial crisis  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/financial-policy-and-central-banking-japan.  
(Giannetti and Simonov 2013) On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro Evidence from 
Japan 
Journal article that provides insight into the micro effects of the recapitalizations on Japanese 
banks. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/real-effects-bank-bailouts-micro-evidence-japan.  
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2004) Solutions to the Japanese Banking Crisis: What Might Work and 
What Definitely Will Fail   




(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010) Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from 
Japan 
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A research paper analyzing the U.S. response to the Global Financial Crisis applying lessons 
from the Japanese financial crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/document/will-us-bank-recapitalization-succeed-eight-
lessons-japan.  
(Kanaya and Woo 2000) The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s - Sources and Lessons  
An overview of the regulatory policies of the Japanese government during the early parts of 
the financial crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/japanese-banking-crisis-1990s-sources-and-lessons. 
(Lipscy and Takinami 2013)The Politics of Financial Crisis Response in Japan and the 
United States  
A paper comparing the financial crisis response in Japan in the 1990s to the U.S. response to 
the Global Financial Crisis.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/politics-financial-crisis-response-japan-and-united-
states.  
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